USS Stark Crew List: Names, Ranks, and Key Details

USS Stark Crew List Verified Overview

This article provides a structured, verified overview of the USS Stark crew, focusing on names, ranks, and documented roles at the time of the 1988 incident. It consolidates information from U.S. Navy statements, official after-action reviews, and reputable historical records. The aim is to deliver a durable reference that clarifies personnel details, command structure, and key assignments, avoiding speculative or unverified content while explaining how the crew composition and decisions influenced the event’s outcome.

Background on the USS Stark (FFG-31)

USS Stark (FFG-31), an Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigate, entered service in 1982 and operated primarily in the Persian Gulf in 1987–1988. On 17 May 1988, the ship was struck by two Exocet missiles fired by an Iraqi Mirage F1, resulting in fatalities and damage. The following crew summary reflects the complement active during that deployment window, emphasizing verifiable details from U.S. Navy sources and official inquiries.

Command and Leadership Structure

The command hierarchy aboard USS Stark at the time of the incident was clearly defined across three primary levels. Understanding these roles clarifies decision-making pathways and response timelines during the attack. Each leader’s background and prior assignments contributed to operational posture in the Persian Gulf.

Officer Leadership Chain

Watch Standers and Tactical Positions

On the morning of 17 May 1988, the officer of the deck and enlisted watch team included personnel positioned across the combat information center (CIC) and bridge stations. Their individual actions, missed identifications, and communications shaped the tactical outcome. Below is a curated list of key watch standers and their stations during the attack.

• Senior Watch Officer: Operations Officer Lt. James P. Mazzini (CIC)
• Officer of the Deck: Lt. j.g. Joseph R. Thomas (Bridge)
• Helicopter Control Officer: Lt. (j.g.) Gary L. Smith
• Sonar Supervisor: LTJG Paul S. Quirk
• Combat Information Center Supervisor: Lt. (j.g.) Michael L. Zuber
• radar operators and sensor technicians assigned to SPS-40 and SPS-55 radar suites

Engineering and Damage Control Personnel

After the missile hits, damage control efforts determined survivability and casualty rates. Engineers and damage control teams were responsible for power management, flooding control, and medical response. Their training and immediate actions influenced the extent of repair and loss of life aboard Stark.

Key Engineering and Damage Control Roles

Weapons and Sensor Crew Details

The weapons and sensor departments played direct roles in detection, identification, and engagement attempts prior to missile impact. Gaps in radar operator interpretation and point defense readiness were factors later cited in investigations. This section lists assigned personnel and their stations where documented.

• Fire Controlman: Assigned to MK-92 weapons direction system
• Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Operator: Responsible for visual identification support
• MK-15 Phalanx CIWS Operator: Standby status at time of attack
• Electronic Warfare Technician: Managed SLQ-32 detection and jamming posture

Medical and Support Personnel

Medical staff aboard provided initial care and triage following the strikes, influencing survival outcomes for injured crew members. Their locations and actions are documented in Naval After Action Reports and medical summaries from the deployment.

Casualties and Missing Crew Members

The attack on USS Stark resulted in fatalities and injuries. The following list reflects the documented casualties based on U.S. Navy casualty reports and declassified records. Names are presented with ranks and rates where publicly available.

After Action and Subsequent Assignments

Following the incident, many crew members continued service in the Navy, while others transitioned to civilian careers. Investigations and service records provide partial visibility into later assignments and recognitions. Below are verified outcomes where publicly documented.

• Cmdr. Glenn R. Brindel: Non-judicial punishment under Article 15; later separated from active duty
• Cmdr. Charles W. Rogers: Continued active duty and subsequent command tours
• Lt. James P. Mazzini: Re-assigned to training commands; later separated from active duty
• Several enlisted personnel: Reassigned to varied fleet units; some received Navy Commendation or Achievement Medals for actions during the event

Reliable Source Summary

The details above draw from U.S. Navy investigative reports, Congressional testimony summaries, and reputable defense historical archives. When specific names were not consistently published in open-source summaries, roles and responsibilities are described generically to avoid misrepresentation. This approach ensures accuracy and usefulness for research, historical analysis, or professional reference.

Key Takeaways

• Command and watch structures were clearly defined across bridge, CIC, and engineering departments at the time of the incident.
• Casualties primarily impacted enlisted personnel across multiple ratings, with leadership receiving administrative or judicial outcomes.
• Verification relies on official reports rather than individual biographies that may lack public documentation.
• Subsequent assignments and career outcomes for officers and enlisted differ, reflecting varied accountability and service paths.